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Like many philosophy teachers, I spend the first two weeks of my introduction to 
philosophy course on what many of us call “baby logic,” covering topics like 
necessary and sufficient conditions, the difference between deduction and 
induction, fallacies, and soundness and validity.  These concepts and skills are 
incorporated throughout the rest of the semester as we discuss various 
philosophical issues. This arrangement, common in introductory courses, has 
scientific and anecdotal support. The research of the educational psychologist Philip 
Abrami and his colleagues suggests that critical thinking skills are better learned 
when they are both taught independently of content and incorporated into the 
content. Anecdotally, many of my students mention in evaluations and end of the 
semester discussions how, in hindsight, they recognize the value of the first two 
weeks of the course. 
 
The key word here is “hindsight.”  During the first two weeks, some students 
struggle to see the point of learning the complicated and abstract concepts. Others 
struggle to understand the material. (Of course, there is overlap between the two 
groups). And like many philosophy teachers, one of my course goals is to instill 
epistemic dispositions that transfer to other parts of students’ lives.  I’ve been 
worried that this goal is hindered by narrowly focusing on the formal aspects of 
arguments. So I’ve been looking for a book that introduces the technical topics 
important for mastering argumentative skills, but embeds them in a way that might 
help my students understand why learning the formal aspects of argumentation 
matters. 
 
Why We Argue (and How We Should): A Guide to Political Disagreement, by Scott 
Aikin and Robert Talisse, does an excellent job of explaining why arguing well 
matters, though it spends little time on the formal aspects of argumentation. The 
book is divided into two parts.  Part I, “A Conception of Argument,” is an extended 
discussion of how the authors’ conceive of “the nature, purpose, and significance of 
argument” (xv).  One goal of this book is to broaden the way philosophers typically 
think about arguments.  Aikin and Talisse explain deductive soundness and 
acknowledge the prominent role it plays in philosophical argument, but they argue 
that there are costs to using deductive soundness as the gold standard.  As they state 
it, the world is “messy and complicated” and we are rarely in a position where we 
can settle our disputes with a formal argument.  They urge us to recognize that 
arguments are used in different ways besides proving the truth of our conclusions; 
we argue to settle disagreements, discover new ways of thinking, and to push our 
investigations closer to an answer (xiii-xiv). After developing their notion of 
argument, the authors use Part I to make the case that knowing how to argue well 
matters both to the individual and to society.  
 
The heart of Why We Argue is the authors’ commitment to explicating an 
understanding of argument that is fundamentally social. The book begins with a 
lengthy discussion of two Aristotelian claims: humans are inherently social beings 
and humans are motivated by a desire to know.   This discussion sets the scene for 
the introduction of their conception of argument: “argument has an inward-looking 
and outward-looking aspect. On the one hand, argument is the attempt to articulate 
the basis for the beliefs we hold; it is an attempt to explain why we believe what we 
believe. On the other hand, argument is the attempt to display to others that they 
have reason to believe as we do” (11-12). This attention to the social aspect of 
argument – that most arguments are not developed in isolation, but among people - 
is central to one of Aikin and Talisse’s main themes. As the subtitle of the book 
suggests, Aikin and Talisse are especially concerned about our political discourse 
and its effect of the health of democracy. This concern shows itself in the examples 
they choose, which are mostly drawn from contemporary US politics, and their 
extensive discussion of the role of argument in a democracy.   They connect 
individual epistemic responsibility to social duties: “democracy is the social and 
political manifestation of our individual cognitive aspiration to be rational.” These 
epistemic goals confer upon citizens “a duty to try to argue well” (38).  Part I ends 
with a chapter on how arguing about issues of public concern confer different 
responsibilities from arguing about matters that effect the individual (52-55). 
 
Part II of the book is a series of short chapters on different dialectical fallacies. This 
focus on dialectical fallacies is in keeping with the authors’ interest in the social role 
of argument.  Aikin and Talisse explain dialectical fallacies as follows: “An argument 
presents a dialectical fallacy when it fails to play its proper social role, most typically 
by failing to actually address those to whom the argument is purported to be 
offered” (xv). The dialectical fallacies that Aikin and Talisse discuss in detail in the 
second section include familiar moves that are not always covered in logic books: 
there is a chapter devoted to incredulous tones and another on spin and framing, 
both of which I found interesting and valuable for students. Another chapter likely 
to be helpful to students is on “the simple truth thesis,” which is when the arguer 
repeatedly points out that her position is obviously right. Personally, though, I 
thought the chapter on what they call “pushovers” the most important; in this 
chapter, the authors discuss in detail the concept of “straw man” arguments.  They 
locate three different versions of what frequently gets lumped together as straw 
men – the traditional straw man, the weak man, and the hollow man.  In their 
taxonomy, the straw man fallacy is misrepresenting your interlocutor’s position, the 
weak man fallacy is responding to the weakest argument of your interlocutor, and 
the hollow man fallacy is fabricating an argument on behalf of your interlocutor.  
The authors emphasize the social aspects of the pushover fallacies; engaging in any 
of them “undoes the intellectual trust required for discussion in good faith” (71). As 
pushover fallacies are among the most common dialectical fallacies in our public 
discourse, I appreciated the careful treatment of this topic.  
 
Aikin and Talisse have written a book that presupposes no prior familiarity with 
philosophy and will engage the general reader. One illustration of this engaging 
style is their use of metaphor. For example, they repeatedly turn to a comparison 
between bodily and cognitive health: reviewing the connection between one’s 
beliefs and one’s evidence becomes an act of cognitive hygiene and maintaining 
one’s cognitive health depends on periodically reflecting on these connections, just 
as flossing is required to maintain the health of one’s teeth (13-14). Thinking about 
argumentation and epistemic responsibility in terms of cognitive health has two 
virtues; it is accessible, in that everyone understands the basics of personal hygiene, 
and motivating, in that most people want to practice healthy behaviors. I can see 
how spending time developing this metaphor in class could pay off in discussions 
throughout the semester as a shorthand way to refer to sound epistemic practices.  
More importantly, using this metaphor conforms to what we know about how 
people learn; building on conceptual structures students already have makes it 
more likely that they will retain the information in the future.  As an added benefit, it 
is nice to see an alternative to the war metaphors that infect much of our discourse 
around argumentation.  
 
For some courses, embedding a discussion of how to argue well inside a conception 
of the duties of citizenship will be a natural fit. I would highly recommend the book 
for these kinds of courses. But even for those who do not frame their courses in this 
way, the book has much to offer. Often, the discussion about the role of argument in 
democracy can be applied directly to other social realms, like the classroom. So, for 
example, in the chapter called “Public Argument in a Democratic Society,” Aikin and 
Talisse argue for two argumentative norms: earnestness and responsibility (45). 
Earnestness requires that we argue in good faith: looking at the reasons before us, 
not getting distracted, and following the argument where it leads. Responsibility 
requires that we investigate all sides of an argument. Both of these norms are 
commonly found in philosophy classrooms and, if one wanted, much of the material 
on democracy could be adapted to talk about the role of argument in the classroom. 
 
Why We Argue is not a replacement for more formal logic texts. For a 
straightforward, concise, and accessible guide to the basics of argumentation, it is 
hard to beat Anthony Weston’s A Rulebook for Arguments.  My main reservation, for 
pedagogical purposes, about Why We Argue is that the formal logical concepts get 
just the barest mention in the introduction. These concepts are central to how many 
people conceive of their introductory courses, and for these courses Why We Argue 
would need to be supplemented with some other materials.  
 
Why We Argue makes a compelling case for the significance of argument in our 
every day lives, but what sets this book apart is the insistence on the importance of 
what we owe to others when we are arguing.  This emphasis on the social aspects is 
an important contribution to the literature on teaching the nature and purpose of 
argument.   
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